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This paper examines the effect of foreign travel by the leader or the head of state on the ability 
of the country to attract foreign capital, as reflected by foreign direct investment inflows. The 
key difficulty in determining a causal effect is the issue of endogeneity. As much as the leader’s 
trips abroad may attract foreign capital inflows, it is also possible that leaders are tempted to 
visit countries known to have a high level of investment out of their borders. To deal with 
potential endogeneity, we use instrumental variable panel estimation techniques. The Arellano 
and Bond (1991) GMM estimation shows that the leader’s trips variable has a statistically 
significant positive coefficient. This is the case even after the inclusion of other control 
variables and after using alternative samples. This result implies that these trips by the leaders 
allow them the opportunity to attract foreign capital. 
 
JEL Code : F21, F23, H11 




« Partout où je vais tout le monde veut avoir des nouvelles du 
Congo (…) Je fais un travail, ensemble avec mes collaborateurs 
de chercher des investisseurs, les rassurer, etc.  
Nous allons continuer. Nous n’allons pas les écouter. Ils avaient 
promis de tout faire pour que les investisseurs ne viennent pas au 
Congo. Nous avons pensé qu’ils sont des frères alors qu’ils sont 
des sorciers...  
Je ris souvent quand j’écoute la polémique sur le voyage 
présidentiel. On a ramené plus d’un milliards et demi de dollars 
grâce à ces voyages, et je vais poursuivre pour ramener les 
investisseurs au Congo ».1  
Speech by the President of the DRC, Félix Tshisekedi, to the Congolese 




This paper examines the effect of the number of foreign trips by the leader of the country, or 
the head of the government, on foreign direct investment inflows. To be specific, this paper 
investigates whether foreign travel by a country's leader allows the country to attract more 
foreign capital and to entice foreign firms to invest in their economy. This is the first attempt 
in the literature to consider the number of trips by heads of state as a determinant of foreign 
direct investment. 
To achieve its objective, the paper uses a novel variable that indicates the number of trips by a 
leader, or a head of a government, to the United States of America. This variable is derived 
from the historical archives of the U.S. Department of State from 1960-2015. The paper 
examines the effect of the number of leader’s trips on foreign direct investment using panel 
estimation techniques. The baseline results, using pooled Ordinary Least Squares and fixed 
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   Translation : « Everywhere I go everyone wants to hear from the Congo (…) I do a job, together with my 
colleagues, to seek investors, reassure them, etc.  We will continue. We are not going to listen to them. They 
promised to do everything to prevent investors from coming to the Congo. We thought they were brothers when 
they were wizards ... I often laugh when I listen to the controversy over the presidential trip. We brought in over 
a billion and a half dollars through these trips, and I'm going to continue to bring investors back to the Congo." 
effects estimations, show that the number of leaders’ trips does not have a statistically 
significant coefficient. 
However, the key difficulty in determining a causal effect of the number of leader’s trips to the 
United States on foreign direct investment is the issue of endogeneity. First, the association 
may be spurious due to a failure to account for an unobserved variable that may determine both 
leader’s trips and foreign direct investment inflows. Second, as much as the leader’s trips abroad 
may attract foreign direct investment inflows, it is also possible that leaders are tempted to visit 
countries known to have a high level of investment out of their borders. In this case, the United 
States is one of the countries with is a significant capital outflow seeking a better return. Thus, 
leaders would tend to travel there to attract American capital to their countries. This highlights 
an issue of reverse causality.  
To deal with potential endogeneity, we use instrumental variable techniques for panel data such 
as the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) instrumental variable approach and the Arellano and Bond 
(199) Generalized method of moments estimation. The results show that the leaders’ trips have 
a statistically significant positive effect on foreign direct investment inflows. This is robust 
even after the inclusion of other control variables and after using alternative samples in the 
analysis. We also focus on the effect of the leader’s trips on foreign direct investment inflows 
from the United States. Our results are robust and similar to those on the effect of the leader’s 
trips on total foreign direct investment inflows. 
There are few studies that focus on the political and economic consequences of leader’s visits. 
For instance, Nitsch (2007) examines the effect of state visits on international trade. The author 
finds that state and official visits are positively correlated with exports, and that there is a strong 
short‐lived effect of visits on bilateral exports growth. Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009) examine 
whether U.S. high-level visits to foreign countries affect public opinion in those countries. The 
authors find that the effect of these visits is initially large and positive, but eventually “exhibited 
a backlash effect.” Our paper is different from these studies in its attempt to examine the effect 
of leader’s visits on foreign direct investment. Thus, this paper’s contribution to the pertinent 
literature is twofold. The paper is the first attempt to examine the effect of foreign travel by 
heads of state on foreign direct investment inflows. The second contribution of the paper is that 
it is also one of the first to highlight the economic consequences of a country's leader's trips 
abroad. This complements our work on the effect of leader’s visits on foreign aid in Kodila-
Tedika and Khalifa (2020a), on democracy in Kodila-Tedika and Khalifa (2020b), on foreign 
debt in Kodila-Tedika and Khalifa (2020c), and on conflict in Kodila-Tedika and Khalifa 
(2020d). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the hypothesis, section 
3 surveys the literature, section 4 includes the detailed description of the data, section 5 includes 
the empirical estimation and the robustness tests, and section 6 concludes. References, tables 
and figures are included thereafter. 
2. Hypothesis 
Leaders and heads of governments travel abroad for a plethora of purposes. One of the most 
important reasons is to strengthen bilateral economic ties between their country and the 
countries they are visiting. These economic ties can be fostered by increasing trade and 
commercial exchange, attracting foreign capital inflows, containing any potential political 
disputes or border conflicts, and facilitating travel and cultural exchange between the citizens 
of the two countries. In the context of this paper, these foreign trips allow the leaders to meet 
with potential foreign officials and investors, to present to them the investment opportunities 
available in their countries, to persuade them to invest in their economies, to highlight the 
concessions and incentives that can be afforded to foreign investors, to bargain with them over 
the terms of their investment, and to negotiate for better economic outcomes for their country. 
If this effort pays off, these trips can lead to an increase in foreign direct investment inflows. 
For instance, Kerner and Lawrence (2014) show that bilateral investment treaties with the 
United States, that are usually signed by high level officials, correlate positively with 
investments in fixed capital. 
Frequent visits to the United States also allow the leaders to interact with American political 
and economic influential figures. The direct interaction and interpersonal contact with these 
figures allow the leaders to cultivate close ties that they can depend on after returning to their 
home countries. Leaders can, thus, use their influential connections and close contacts in the 
United States to lobby for foreign capital and to broker deals through formal and informal 
channels with American firms with the support of American political actors. This can lead the 
leader’s trips to increase foreign direct investment inflows as well. This is consistent with the 
arguments in Gift and Krcmaric (2017) who discuss the socialization and transnational linkages 
cultivated by leaders during their experiences abroad.   
From the point of view of multinational corporations, foreign investors can take the trip of the 
head of state as a strong signal from the highest levels of a country's leadership for their serious 
commitment to facilitate foreign capital flows, to offer concessions to foreign firms, to ensure 
the security of foreign property, and to spend on the essential infrastructure for this type of 
investment. Thus, we would expect that the number of leaders’ trips to be positively associated 
with foreign direct investment. This is especially the case as multinational corporations are seen 
to be interested in high level diplomatic and foreign policy interactions. As stated in the Harvard 
Business Review2: “In this new reality, the most successful multinational companies will be 
those that make expertise in international affairs central to their operations, adopting what can 
best be described as a corporate foreign policy. Such a policy will have two goals: to improve 
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 Chipman, John. “Why Your Company Needs a Foreign Policy.” Harvard Business Review, September, 
2016. 
a company’s ability to operate in foreign environments through effective corporate diplomacy, 
and to ensure its success wherever it is engaged through careful geopolitical due diligence.” 
The article also states that companies “must cultivate wide and deep relations with both 
government and society. Wherever they wish to operate, they must identify the various 
stakeholders, understand which groups may be supportive of company goals and which are 
likely to protest or oppose them, and develop strategies to engage each constituency 
effectively.” This implies that it is imperative for these corporations to be aware of the events 
in the global arena, and in particular in the countries they plan to invest in. The visit of the 
leader of that country to the United States is obviously an event that cannot be ignored by a 
corporation pondering whether to invest in that country.  
Multinational corporations also have an effect on American foreign policy through lobbying. 
Kim and Milner (forthcoming) use a dataset on lobbying activities of public firms in the United 
States, and find strong evidence for an increase in lobbying expenditures when firms become 
multinational on a diverse set of foreign policy issues. Their finding suggests “that MNCs are 
important political actors whose distinct interests and influence should be incorporated into our 
understanding of foreign policy-making.” This implies that if multinational corporations are 
interested in investing in an economy, they can lobby for a diplomatic support to their efforts 
that can culminate in extending an invitation for the leader of that country to visit the United 
States. This implies that these visits may lead to a conclusion of agreements that facilitate the 
investment of American firms in the visiting leader’s country. Thus, the leader’s trips can 
increase foreign direct investment inflows. 
Besides lobbying by these firms, U.S. foreign policy adopts an approach of extending support 
to American firms overseas. According to a report by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office3: “U.S. embassies furnish assistance to U.S. firms overseas, including diplomatic 
support;” It would come as no surprise that this continuous effort by American embassies can 
be supported by diplomatic invitations to the country’s leader to visit the United States. This is 
because the decisions in many countries to facilitate foreign capital flows are solely in the hands 
of the country’s leadership. Thus, the leader’s trips can attract American capital to their 
countries.   
On the other hand, the travel of the head of the government is costly. Leaders usually travel 
with a large entourage that includes security personnel, policy makers, public officials, expert 
advisors, private entrepreneurs, staff of the presidential cabinet, members of the press corps and 
others. These trips are a burden on the coffers of the state due to the need to cover the cost of 
traveling, lodging, security, transportation, and meetings of the leaders and their retinue. These 
costly trips increase the opportunity cost for the social and physical infrastructure essential for 
foreign investment. This can include human capital investment spending that improves the level 
of skills of domestic workers who can potentially be employed by foreign companies, in 
addition to spending on the infrastructure for transportation, communication and utilities that 
are essential for any type of investment. Thus, the leaders’ trips can lead to a crowding out 
effect where an increase in these costly trips abroad may lead to a reallocation of resources 
away from productive spending that is essential for investment. In addition to the direct cost of 
the trip, these trips will also take the officials who accompany the leaders away from their other 
duties for a longer period of time. This may adversely affect their efforts to create a conducive 
environment for foreign corporations. 
Leaders who travel a lot can also send a negative signal to investors. These trips can be 
interpreted as a lack of seriousness in dealing with the challenges that these countries face, or 
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 U.S. Foreign Relations and Multinational Corporations: What's the Connection? PAD-78-58; B-
172255. August 23, 1978. 
lack of commitment to implement reforms needed to attract foreign capital, or lack of interest 
in spending on the social and physical infrastructure necessary for foreign investment. These 
trips, and the leader’s direct involvement, can also signal the inefficiencies of the other 
institutions that are supposed to be in the forefront of the efforts of attracting foreign capital, 
such as the chambers of commerce, the diplomatic corps, or any government agencies in charge 
of attracting foreign investments. Thus, we would expect that the leaders’ trips to have an 
adverse effect on foreign direct investment. 
Given that the effect of the number of leaders’ foreign trips on foreign direct investment inflows 
is inconclusive, an empirical analysis is warranted. 
3. Literature 
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment. The 
studies in this literature emphasize the significance of several determinants such as the level of 
economic and financial development, the suitability of infrastructure, human capital, 
institutional quality, policy quality and democratic governance. 
Some studies focus on the effect of institutional quality on foreign direct investment. These 
institutions offer protection for the property of foreign firms, protect foreign investors from the 
risk of expropriation, limit bribery payments to corrupt public officials, allow foreign firms to 
enforce contracts, and allows for the judicial independence needed for litigation in case of 
dispute with a domestic entity. In this context, Du et al. (2008) examine the impact of 
institutions, including property rights protection and contract enforcement, on the location 
choice of foreign direct investment. The authors find that U.S. multinationals prefer to invest 
in Chinese regions that have better protection of intellectual property rights, less government 
intervention in business operations, less corruption, and better contract enforcement. Du et al. 
(2012) compare the sensitivity of the location choice of foreign direct investment toward the 
variation in institutional quality across China. The authors find that enterprises from source 
countries that are culturally more distant from China exhibit a stronger aversion to regions with 
weaker institutions. Busse and Hefeker (2007) explore the connection between political risk, 
institutions, and FDI inflows. Their results show that political stability, internal and external 
conflict, corruption, ethnic tensions, law and order, government accountability, and quality of 
bureaucracy are significant determinants of FDI inflows. Asiedu et al. (2009) examine the effect 
of the risk of expropriation on FDI inflows. The authors show that the threat of expropriation 
decreases FDI inflows, and that foreign aid mitigates the adverse effect of expropriation risk 
but cannot eliminate it entirely.  
Other studies focus on the effect of the democratic system of governance on the ability of the 
country to attract foreign capital. On one hand, democratic institutions hinder foreign capital 
inflows by limiting the monopolistic approach of multinational corporations, by protecting 
domestic investors from foreign competition, and by constraining host governments' desire to 
offer generous financial incentives and fiscal concessions to foreign investors. On the other 
hand, democratic institutions may promote foreign capital inflows by ensuring more credible 
property rights protection and reducing the risk of expropriation.  
In this context, Li and Resnick (2003) find that increases in democracy enhance property rights 
protection, which indirectly encourages FDI inflows. The authors also find that after controlling 
for their positive effect through property rights protection, democracy also decreases FDI 
inflows. Li (2009) shows that democratic governments are most likely to expropriate foreign 
investment when leaders face little political constraints and when their countries experience 
frequent leadership turnover. The author also finds that autocrats are least likely to expropriate 
foreign assets when they face high political constraints and have stayed in power for a long 
time. Harms and Ursprung (2002) explore whether political repression boosts foreign 
investment. The authors arrive at the conclusion that multinational enterprises appear to be 
attracted by countries in which civil rights and political freedoms are respected. Asiedu and 
Lien (2011) examine whether the abundance of natural resources in host countries alter the 
relationship between democracy and FDI. The authors find that democracy increases FDI 
inflows if the share of minerals and oil in total exports is less than some critical value.  
Other studies examine the effect of various types of policies on the ability to attract foreign 
capital. Some of these policies have direct implications on foreign investors, such as capital 
controls, while others aim at implementing economic reforms that might attract foreign firms. 
For instance, Asiedu and Lien (2003) examine the effect on FDI of different types of capital 
control policies such as the existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on capital account, 
and restrictions on the repatriation of export proceeds. The authors show that in the 1970s and 
1980s, none of these policies had a significant effect on FDI, while in the 1990s all were 
significant. The authors also find that capital controls have no effect on FDI to sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Middle East, but affects FDI to East Asia and Latin America negatively. Asiedu 
(2006) shows that lower inflation, suitable infrastructure, higher human capital, openness to 
FDI, less corruption, political stability and a dependable legal system have a positive effect on 
FDI. These findings suggest that countries can attract FDI by improving their institutions and 
policy quality. Asiedu (2002) explores whether factors that determine FDI affect countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa differently. The results confirm that better infrastructure has no significant 
effect on FDI to sub-Saharan Africa, while trade openness promotes FDI to all developing 
countries even though the marginal benefit is less for sub-Saharan Africa. Gastanaga et al. 
(1998) examine the effects of different policy variables and find a particular positive effect of 
trade openness on foreign direct investment. 
Other studies explore the importance of human capital as countries can enhance their 
attractiveness as locations for FDI by pursuing policies that increase the level of local skills and 
labor force capabilities. In this context, Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) find that human capital is a 
statistically significant determinant of FDI inflows, is one of the most critical determinants, and 
its importance has increased over time. Cleeve et al. (2015) assess the role of human capital on 
FDI inflows to sub-Saharan Africa. Their results show that human capital has a significant 
influence on FDI, but no evidence of the increasing importance of human capital on the type of 
FDI flowing to sub-Saharan Africa. Francois et al. (forthcoming) who find that greater 
educational attainment of the leader of the country is associated with higher FDI, and that the 
leader having tertiary education in economics and prior experience in business is associated 
with greater FDI. Asiedu et al. (2015) examine the relationship between HIV/AIDS and foreign 
direct investment. The authors find that HIV/AIDS has a negative but diminishing effect on 
FDI.  
Besides economic development, some studies argue that the level of financial development is 
also essential in attracting foreign direct investment. Desbordes and Wei (2017) find that both 
source and destination financial development have a large positive influence on greenfield, 
expansion, and mergers & acquisitions FDI, by directly increasing access to external finance 
and indirectly encouraging manufacturing activities. 
There are also studies that examine the effect of social capital on economic exchange between 
countries. Guiso et al. (2009) examine how bilateral trust between European countries affects 
their trade and financial flows. The authors find that lower bilateral trust leads to less trade 
between two countries, less foreign portfolio investment, and less foreign direct investment.  
The contribution that is closest to ours is Constant and Tien (2010) who examine whether 
foreign-educated African leaders attract more foreign direct investment to their country. Their 
analysis shows that leaders' foreign education promotes foreign direct investment, indicating 
the role of networks and connections that these leaders cultivate while studying abroad. Our 
paper, however, differs from this study in terms of focusing on the leaders’ foreign travel rather 
than the leader's education. Thus, ours study is more concerned about the networks and 
connections that the leaders cultivate during their travels abroad rather than those built during 
their education abroad. We argue that our approach makes more sense as the networks created 
during the leader's education abroad might not be with those foreign figures that will eventually 
influence bilateral economic and commercial ties between the two countries. However, the 
connections made during the leader’s trips are with those policy makers and entrepreneurs who 
are directly in charge of these decisions. Another contribution close to our is Kerner and 
Lawrence (2014) who show that bilateral investment treaties with the United States correlate 
positively with investments in fixed capital and have little, if any, correlation with other 
measures of multinational corporations activity. Our paper contributes to this study by arguing 
that these treaties are more likely to be signed during a high level visit of the leader of the 
country to the United States. 
3. Data 
The countries included in the analysis are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, 
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, 
Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, 
Congo. Dem. Rep., Congo. Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt. Arab Rep., El Salvador, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia. Georgia, The, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Korea. Rep., Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, 
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, 
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
The estimates are based on a 5-year panel. This is because foreign direct investment decisions 
undertaken by multinational corporations are not likely to be the outcome of factors occurring 
more than a few years prior. Mosley (200) show very short time horizons of less than a few 
years for decisions made by portfolio investors, while Hayashi (1978) suggests that the time 
horizon of multinationals are less than 10 years. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for 
all the variables used in the analysis.  
The dependent variable in our analysis is foreign direct investment inflow as a percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product. This is derived from the World Development Indicators. For foreign 
direct investment, we use a 5-year panel as follows: 71-75, 76-80, 81-85, 86-90, 91-95, 96-00, 
01-05, 06-10, and 11-15. 
The variable of interest is leaders' trips, which is calculated as the number of trips by the 
government's leader to the United States of America during the period 1960-2015. These 
include state visits, official working visits, summits, private visits, informal visits, meetings, 
and working visits. This data is derived from the Office of the Historian, which is affiliated with 
the Department of Sate of the United States of America.4 Figure 1 shows a world map of 
leader’s trips to the United States during the period 1960-2015. Several control variables are 
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used in the analysis. These are variables identified in the literature, surveyed in the previous 
section, as determinants of foreign direct investment. Appendix A presents the source and 
description of all the variables used in this study.  
4. Estimation  
This section conducts an empirical estimation of the effect of the number of leaders’ trips to the 
United States of America on foreign direct investment inflows to their country during the period 
1960-2015. To explore this relationship we use the following equation  
 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑖𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + ℵ𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (1) 
FDIit is foreign direct investment inflows in country i in year t. LeadersTripsit-1 is the number 
of trips by the leader of country i to the United States in year t-1. ℵit-1 is a vector of control 
variables of country i in year t-1. The vector of control variables includes those commonly 
identified in the literature as determinants of foreign direct investment. Thus, we control for the 
total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP, the logarithm of GDP per capita, annual 
GDP growth rate, trade openness, the inflation rate, and democracy. The 𝜇𝑖 denotes a full set 
of country dummies, the 𝜎𝑡 denotes a full set of time effects that capture common shocks to 
foreign direct investment of all countries, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an error term capturing all other omitted 
factors, with E(𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 0 for all i and t.  
4.1. Baseline Results 
To collect the variable on leaders’ trips, we use historical data from the Department of State of 
the United States of America. We use the number of leaders' trips to the U.S.A. from 1960 to 
2015. Initially, the objective was to use the total number of leaders’ trips to all countries. 
However, the unavailability of this type of data did not allow us to have such a distribution. 
Thus, instead of considering all destination countries we only consider leaders’ trips to the main 
country with capital outflows. This is a fact that deserves to be emphasized as the United States 
is identified as the main investor according to (OECD 2020). This fact can justify our focus on 
travel by leaders to the United States. 
The baseline results are included in table 2. Columns 1-3 of table 2 include the pooled OLS and 
the fixed effects OLS results using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. Columns 4-6 of 
table 2 include the pooled OLS and the fixed effects OLS results using robust standard errors 
clustered by country. The pooled OLS is identical to our regression equation except for the 
omission of the fixed effects that reflect country dummies. These country dummies capture any 
time-invariant country characteristics that affect foreign direct investment. When the true model 
is given by our regression equation, pooled OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. In this 
context, the fixed effects estimator is more consistent. The results in table 2 of the pooled OLS 
and fixed effects show that the coefficient of leader’s trips does not have a statistically 
significant effect in all specifications.  
However, we do not assume that fixed effects estimations indicate a causal effect of leader’s 
trips on foreign direct investment. In the following section, we conduct an instrumental variable 
strategy to account for these problems. 
5. Robustness 
5.1. Endogeneity 
The relationship found so far assumes that the leaders’ trips are exogenous to foreign direct 
investment. However, the problem of endogeneity cannot be ignored. First, the association may 
be spurious due to the failure to account for an unobserved channel which is affecting both 
variables. It is likely that economies that are different for a variety of causes will differ both in 
the number of leaders’ trips and their foreign direct investment inflows as well. Second, our 
leader’s travel variable only considers travel to the United States. This country is among the 
countries where there is a significant outflow of capital seeking a better return. In this sense, 
political leaders would tend to travel there. This means that as much as a larger number of 
leader’s trips can attract more foreign capital, it is also possible that leaders are tempted to travel 
to countries known to be major investors out of their borders. This highlights the possibility of 
reverse causality.  
To solve this issue, we need a source of exogenous variation in leader’s trips by using an 
instrumental variable approach. To account for these sources of potential endogeneity, we use 
two estimation techniques. The first is Anderson and Hsiao (1982) approach. This technique 
eliminates the fixed effects by taking first differences, and then conducts instrumental variable 
estimation using lagged values as instruments. Column 7 of table 2 includes the results of the 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimation. The results show that the coefficient of the leader’s 
trips does not have a statistically significant effect on foreign direct investment inflows. 
However, the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator does not exploit all the pertinent moment 
conditions. Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a generalized method of moments GMM 
estimator using all of these moment conditions. When these conditions are valid, this GMM 
estimator is more efficient than the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator. In the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) technique, first differences of the regression equation are taken to eliminate the 
individual effects. Then, lags of the dependent variable are used as instruments for differenced 
lags of the dependent variable.  
Column 8 of table 2 shows the results of the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic GMM 
estimation, while column 9 of table 2 shows the results of the Arellano and Bond (1991) systems 
GMM estimation. The results show a positive and statistically significant coefficient for 
leader’s trips. In column 9, the coefficient of the leaders’ trips variable is 0.571. This implies 
that a one standard deviation increase in the number of leaders' trips to the United States 
translates into an increase in foreign direct investment by 1.23. 
5.2. Before and after the end of the Cold War 
We also conduct some tests to check the robustness of our results. The first test compares the 
effects of the leader’s trips on foreign direct investment before and after the end of the cold war. 
This is because the confrontational climate during the cold war caused countries around the 
world to attempt to cope with a highly antagonistic environment and to survive in a global arena 
squeezed between the conflicting interests of the two super powers. This implies that high level 
visits to the United States probably focused on geopolitical developments in the context of the 
cold war rather than the strengthening of bilateral ties through the promotion of trade exchange 
or capital flows. In addition, many countries became independent after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union at the end of the cold war. This implies that there are more countries whose leaders are 
interested in visiting the United States, and eager to strengthen bilateral relationships through 
trade and capital flows.  
The results are included in table 3, and show that the leader’s trips to the United States do not 
have a significant effect on foreign direct investment inflows before the end of the cold war, 
but has a statistically significant positive effect after the end of the cold war. This implies that 
during the cold war, leader’s trips to the United States were more concentrated on discussing 
other geostrategic issues than promoting economic ties. However, after the end of the cold war 
these trips seem to be focused on strengthening bilateral economic ties through attracting 
American capital. 
5.3. Differences across continents 
We implement another robustness test where we consider heterogeneous effects across 
continents. This is because it is possible that countries in certain parts of the world are more 
concerned about regional instability or cross border conflicts. This implies that the visits of their 
leaders to the United States will be more consumed in discussions around these issues rather 
than on bilateral economic ties. It is also possible that there are countries in certain parts of the 
World who are desperate to attract foreign capital, and in particular that of American firms, to 
their countries. Thus, the visits of their leaders to the United States will be taken as an 
opportunity to facilitate this type of financial flows.   
The results are included in table 4 and show a positive effect of leader’s trips to the United 
States from the Americas and Europe using the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic GMM 
estimation, and a positive effect of leader’s trips to the United States from the Americas and 
Africa using the Arellano and Bond (1991) systems GMM estimation. 
5.4. Effect on FDI from U.S.A.  
So far, we focused on the inflow of total foreign direct investment regardless of the origin. This 
could be seen as a bias especially that we focus on the leaders' trips to the United States. In this 
context, we wish to examine if the leader’s trips to the United States affect foreign direct 
investment inflows from the United States differently than capital inflows from other countries. 
If these visits affect FDI from the United States differently than aggregate FDI inflows, this 
implies there are differences in the extent to which investors are aware of these visits or that 
there are bilateral concessions that need to be take into consideration. 
To consider this effect, we run the regression with foreign direct investment from the United 
States as our dependent variable. This data is derived from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis5. The data provides the value of direct investment in the United States by overseas 
investors and the value of U.S. investment in other countries. We use the value of U.S. 
investment in other countries6 which starts from 1966. So the panel used is from 66-70, 71-75, 




  Countries included are : Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Congo. Dem. Rep., Congo. Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt. Arab Rep., El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Gambia. The, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea. Rep., Lesotho, 
Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
76-80, 81-85, 86-90, 91-95, 96-00, 01-05, 06-10, and 11-15. Figure 2 shows a positive 
relationship between the number of leader’s trips and foreign direct investment inflows from 
the United States. 
5.4.1. Baseline Results 
Table 5 includes the results and show a statistically positive significant effect of leader’s trips 
when we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) systems GMM estimation, as shown in column 9. 
The coefficient of the leaders’ trips variable is 0.107. This implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in the number of leaders' trips to the United States translates into an increase in foreign 
direct investment by 0.23. 
5.4.2. Robustness 
We also conduct similar robustness tests to the ones we presented earlier, while we focus on 
the effect of the leader’s trips on foreign direct investment inflows from the United States. In 
table 6, we explore the differences across continents. The results show a positive effect of 
leader’s trips to the United States from the Americas and Europe using the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) dynamic GMM estimation, and a positive effect of leader’s trips to the United States 
from the Americas and Africa using the Arellano and Bond (1991) systems GMM estimation. 
We also examine the effect of the leader’s trips before and after the end of the cold war. Table 
7 shows that the effect is positive and statistically significant only after the end of the cold war. 
These findings confirm the robustness of our earlier results. 
8. Conclusion 
                                                             
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. 
This paper examines the effect of foreign travel by the leader or the head of state on the ability 
of the country to attract foreign capital, as reflected by foreign direct investment inflows. To 
deal with potential endogeneity, the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimation shows that the 
leader’s trips variable has a statistically significant positive coefficient. This is the case even 
after the inclusion of other control variables and after using alternative samples. This result 
implies that these trips by the leaders allow them the opportunity to attract foreign capital. This 
is particularly the case after the end of the cold war. We find similar results when we focus on 
the effect of the number of leader’s trips on foreign direct investment inflows from the United 
States. 
Future research can explore the effect of leader’s trips on trade inflows, foreign portfolio 
investment, foreign aid, and foreign debt. Future scholarly endeavors can also explore the 
possibility of expanding the data set of the number of leaders’ trips to other countries besides 
the United States. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs     Mean     Std. Dev.     
Leaders' trip to USA 1,570   1.526752  2.157202   
FDI, net inflow 1,195   3.051363  5.325316   
Inflation  1,419   38.8236  292.4955   
Total natural resources rents (% of 
GDP) 1,281   8.276036  11.27628   
Log of GDP per capita 1,449   8.063406  1.540387   
Trade openness 1,438   36.38039  23.30941   
GDP growth (annual %) 1,422   3.983719  4.573222   
Democracy  1,540   1.014654  7.275895   
US FDI, net inflow 686   .5438134  1.427739   
  






















































































Leaders' trip to USA
US FDI/GDP Fitted values





























Leaders' trips to USAt-1 0.137* 0.088 0.085 0.137 0.088 0.085 -2.604 0.778** 0.571*** 
 (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.096) (0.099) (0.100) (16.047) (0.372) (0.191) 
Openess
 t-1 0.120*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.120*** 0.112*** 0.113*** -0.844 -0.054 0.051*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (3.371) (0.096) (0.008) 
Log of GDP per capita
 t-1 -0.435*** -0.332** -0.324** -0.435** -0.332 -0.324 -16.607 -2.912 -0.599*** 
 (0.156) (0.161) (0.161) (0.209) (0.226) (0.227) (143.352) (2.215) (0.143) 
Inflation
 t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth (annual %)
 t-1 0.060 0.055 0.050 0.060 0.055 0.050 -0.050 -0.046 -0.094** 
 (0.060) (0.062) (0.062) (0.040) (0.037) (0.039) (3.768) (0.124) (0.039) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)
 t-1 0.060*** 0.043* 0.043* 0.060* 0.043 0.043 6.262 -0.007 0.018 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (31.418) (0.061) (0.016) 
Democracy
 t-1 0.157*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.157*** 0.105*** 0.104*** -4.644 0.203*** 0.054* 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (22.366) (0.062) (0.028) 
FDI(-1)        0.521 0.603*** 
        (0.433) (0.043) 
Countries No No YES No No YES No No No 
Years No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Cons 1.189 -1.202 -0.767 1.189 -1.202 -0.767 -22.092  3.742*** 
 (1.121) (1.374) (1.374) (1.496) (1.882) (1.886) (110.119)  (0.893) 
Hansen J test        0.002 0.000 
AR(2) test        0.683  0.045 
Number of observations 991 991 991 991 991 991 834 801 944 
R2 0.294 0.325 0.327 0.294 0.325 0.327 .   
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Columns 1, 2 and 3 are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. Pooled cross-sectional OLS and Fixed effects OLS regression in columns 4, 5 and 6 
estimated with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Column 7 uses the instrumental variables method of Anderson and Hsiao (1982), with White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction, 
and columns 8 and 9 use the GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991), with robust standard errors; in both methods we instrument for Leaders' trips to USA
 
using a double lag. 
Table 3. The effect of leader’s trips on total FDI before and after the end of the cold war 
 




















Leaders' trips to USAt-1 -1.647 -0.507* -0.184 1.974 0.929** 0.870*** 
 (2.981) (0.297) (0.152) (4.755) (0.411) (0.256) 
Openess
 t-1 0.528 0.054 0.068*** 0.133 -0.051 0.069*** 
 (1.102) (0.034) (0.007) (0.870) (0.110) (0.011) 
Log of GDP per capita
 t-1 -1.429 -0.128 -0.071 12.975 -3.346 -0.854*** 
 (21.574) (1.261) (0.105) (27.274) (2.508) (0.201) 
Inflation
 t-1 -0.034 -0.001** -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.083) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDP growth (annual %)
 t-1 0.111 -0.070 -0.015 0.807 -0.059 -0.134*** 
 (0.796) (0.061) (0.032) (0.676) (0.155) (0.049) 
Total natural resources rents (% 
of GDP)
 t-1 
-0.246 0.003 0.045*** -2.420 -0.019 0.018 
 (0.658) (0.035) (0.016) (8.154) (0.088) (0.020) 
Democracy
 t-1 0.958 0.047 0.046** 1.184 0.233*** 0.050 
 (1.982) (0.054) (0.022) (4.770) (0.080) (0.037) 
FDI(-1)  -0.687 -0.429***  0.509 0.590*** 
  (0.556) (0.118)  (0.497) (0.051) 
Year  Yes No No Yes No No 
Cons 1.293  0.063 -12.316  4.876*** 
 (2.442)  (0.747) (49.115)  (1.174) 
Number of observations 184 161 262 650 640 682 
Hansen J test  0.000 0.815  0.035 0.000 
AR(2) test     0.374 0.003 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Column 1 and 4 uses the instrumental variables method of Anderson and Hsiao (1982), with White (1980) heteroskedasticity 
correction, and columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 use the GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991), with robust standard errors; in both methods we instrument for Leaders' trips to 
USA
 
using a double lag. 
Table 4. The effect of leader’s trips on total FDI in different continents 
 Anderson-Hsiao IV 
 Africa Americas Asia Europe Oceania 
Leaders' trips to USAt-1 0.726 0.196 -16.760 3.032 3.845 
 (1.137) (0.699) (737.322) (103.485) (140.094) 
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 292 159 200 155 28 
 Arellano-Bond GMM (Dynamic) 
 
Africa Americas Asia Europe Oceania 
Leaders' trips to USAt-1 0.687 0.712*** 0.293 0.441* -0.066 
 (0.462) (0.270) (0.900) (0.263) (0.283) 
FDI(-1) 0.081 0.343*** 0.395 0.524* 0.006 
 (0.486) (0.114) (0.339) (0.279) (0.153) 
Number of observations 279 152 193 150 27 
Hansen J test 0.209 0.267 0.368 0.677 1.000 
AR(2) test 0.121 0.995 0.323 0.996 0.307 
 Arellano-Bond GMM (System) 
 Africa Americas Asia Europe Oceania 
Leaders' trips to USAt-1 1.513*** 0.494*** -0.060 0.237 -0.002 
 (0.576) (0.158) (0.144) (0.224) (0.402) 
FDI(-1) 0.447*** 0.582*** 0.641*** 0.622*** 0.138 
 (0.078) (0.095) (0.065) (0.098) (0.186) 
Number of observations 329 176 226 181 32 
Hansen J test 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.200 
AR(2) test 0.013 0.942 0.845 0.408 0.304 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; all estimations control for the variables used in table 2 and the constant. 
 





























Leaders' trips to USAt-1 0.038 0.024 0.025 0.038 0.024 0.025 -0.137 0.120 0.107*** 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.273) (0.119) (0.040) 
Openess
 t-1 
0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.102 0.003 0.010*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.171) (0.014) (0.002) 
Log of GDP per capita
 t-1 
0.047 0.035 0.034 0.047 0.035 0.034 1.776 0.090 0.005 
 
(0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.059) (0.056) (0.057) (9.759) (0.482) (0.049) 
Inflation
 t-1 
0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth (annual %)
 t-1 
-0.028 -0.027 -0.025 -0.028 -0.027 -0.025 0.168 -0.087** -0.057*** 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.620) (0.044) (0.020) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)
 t-1 
-0.026** -0.028** -0.028*** -0.026* -0.028* -0.028* 0.669 -0.007 -0.019*** 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (1.216) (0.015) (0.007) 
Democracy
 t-1 
-0.009 -0.017 -0.017 -0.009 -0.017 -0.017 -0.220 -0.008 -0.018* 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.598) (0.027) (0.010) 
FDI(-1)        
0.407*** 0.642*** 
        
(0.080) (0.044) 
Countries No No YES No No YES No No No 
Years No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Cons -0.486 -0.601 -0.668 -0.486 -0.601 -0.668 -3.772  -0.105 
 
(0.367) (0.416) (0.412) (0.500) (0.544) (0.514) (5.665)  (0.389) 
Hansen J test        0.155 0.000 
AR(2) test        0.172 0.000 
Number of observations 468 468 468 468 468 468 369 361 457 
R2 0.178 0.201 0.202 0.178 0.201 0.202 .   
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Columns 1, 2 and 3 are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. Pooled cross-sectional OLS and Fixed effects OLS estimationsin columns 4, 5 and 6 with 
robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Column 7 uses the instrumental variables technique of Anderson and Hsiao (1982), with White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction, and columns 
8 and 9 use the GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991), with robust standard errors; in both methods we instrument for Leaders' trips to USA
 
using a double lag. 
 
Table 6. The effect of leader’s trips on FDI from U.S.A. in different continents 
 Anderson-Hsiao IV 
 Africa Americas Asia Europa Oceania 
Leaders' trips to USAt-1 -0.158 -0.165 -0.094 -0.681 -0.132 
 
(11.144) (0.368) (0.520) (0.429) (0.168) 
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 39 109 89 118 14 
 Arellano-Bond GMM (Dynamic) 
 
Africa Americas Asia Europa Oceania 
Leaders' trips to USAt-1 0.687 0.712*** 0.293 0.441* -0.066 
 
(0.462) (0.270) (0.900) (0.263) (0.283) 
FDI(-1) 0.081 
0.343*** 0.395 0.524* 0.006 
 
(0.486) (0.114) (0.339) (0.279) (0.153) 
Number of observations 279 152 193 150 27 
Hansen J test 0.209 0.995 0.368 0.677 1.000 
AR(2) test 0.121 0.267 0.323 0.996 0.307 
 Arellano-Bond GMM (System) 
 Africa Americas Asia Europa Oceania 
Leaders' trips to USAt-1 1.513*** 0.494*** -0.060 0.237 -0.002 
 
(0.576) (0.158) (0.144) (0.224) (0.402) 
FDI(-1) 0.447*** 
0.582*** 0.641*** 0.622*** 0.138 
 
(0.078) (0.095) (0.065) (0.098) (0.186) 
Number of observations 329 176 226 181 32 
Hansen J test 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.200 
AR(2) test 0.013 0.942 0.845 0.408 0.304 








Table 7. The effect of leader’s trips on FDI from U.S.A. before and after the end of the cold war 
 
























Leaders' trips to USAt-1 0.203 -0.507* -0.184 -0.681 0.929** 0.870*** 
 
(0.542) (0.297) (0.152) (1.349) (0.411) (0.256) 
Openess
 t-1 
-0.084 0.054 0.068*** 0.449 -0.051 0.069*** 
 
(0.167) (0.034) (0.007) (0.679) (0.110) (0.011) 
Log of GDP per capita
 t-1 
1.588 -0.128 -0.071 -2.371 -3.346 -0.854*** 
 
(2.566) (1.261) (0.105) (25.206) (2.508) (0.201) 
Inflation
 t-1 
-0.008 -0.001** -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.016) (0.000) (0.001) (0.011) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDP growth (annual %)
 t-1 
0.050 -0.070 -0.015 -0.268 -0.059 -0.134*** 
 
(0.106) (0.061) (0.032) (0.800) (0.155) (0.049) 
Total natural resources rents (% 
of GDP)
 t-1 
-0.016 0.003 0.045*** 0.828 -0.019 0.018 
 
(0.179) (0.035) (0.016) (3.815) (0.088) (0.020) 
Democracy
 t-1 
0.051 0.047 0.046** -0.033 0.233*** 0.050 
 
(0.167) (0.054) (0.022) (1.093) (0.080) (0.037) 





Year  Yes No No Yes No No 
Cons -0.262  0.063 9.736  4.876*** 
 
(0.710)  (0.747) (25.332)  (1.174) 
Number of observations 123 161 262 246 640 682 
Hansen J test  0.162 0.000  0.035 0.000 
AR(2) test   0.000  0.374 0.003 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Columns 1 and 4 uses the instrumental variables technique of Anderson and Hsiao (1982), with White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity correction, and columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 use the GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991), with robust standard errors; 
in both methods we instrument for Leaders' trips to USA
 





Appendix A. Data Sources  
Variables Definition  Sources 
Inflation The price inflation rate World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Trade openness (Sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
as a share of GDP)/2 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Democracy The Polity score captures a country’s political 
regime on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 
(strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). 
Polity IV Project 
Leaders' trips to USA 
Number of trips by heads of governments or state 
leaders to the USA during the period 1960-2015. 
https://history.state.gov/departm
enthistory 
GDP growth (annual 
%) 
Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita 1960-
2015. 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Log of GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international 
$) 1960-2015. 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Africa Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Africa and 0 otherwise 
Own Calculation 
Asia Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Asia and 0 otherwise 
Own Calculation 
America Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a America and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
Oceania Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Oceania and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
Europe Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Europe and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
